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There is a considerable evidence showing that many states in the Global South are very weak, and therefore struggle to carry 
out basic responsibilities of statehood. While a handful of studies have examined problems associated with state weakness, there 
is a paucity of scholarly literature that thoroughly explores its empirical implications on regional security. It is on this note that this 
article draws on the contemporary developments in the Lake Chad region to elucidate the nodes that connect state weakness and 
regional security instability. It argues that any state that cannot efficaciously control its borders, promptly respond to security 
emergencies and demonstrate substantial institutional capacity in addressing citizens’ needs is vulnerable to create regional 
insecurity, especially when the neighbouring states share similar attributes. The article concludes that an alternative approach to 
ensuring lasting regional security in such regions, especially in the present Lake Chad region, is deliberate commitment to state-
building.  
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Sovereign states are evidently the most important players 
in the politics of security stability (and instability), both at the 
global and regional levels (Gilpin 1981). In spite of the in-
creasing proliferation of non-state actors, the importance of 
states as independent political entities in the international 
community cannot be overemphasised (Heywood 2011; Gold-
stein and Pevehouse 2014). In line with the Thomas Hobbes’ 
metaphysical state of nature, it is the collective demand for 
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preservation of shared interests that propelled the establish-
ment of states. They bear vital responsibilities, both to the na-
tional polity and to their citizens. Inability to discharge the as-
signed tasks is therefore an aberration and a signal of gradual 
departure from statehood (Arthur 2010). Jackson and Søren-
sen (2013, 5) note that the fundamental values states are nor-
mally expected to safeguard include “security, freedom, order, 
justice, and welfare”. This implies that state sovereignty, even  
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over domestic affairs, goes hand in hand with some of these 
responsibilities that are very dear to the survival of human ex-
istence. Morgenthau (1948, 396) designates the state as a 
“compulsory organisation of society” with the basic roles of 
providing “legal continuity of the society” and “agencies for the 
enforcement of [internal] laws”. This buttresses the idea that 
peaceful coexistence of citizens within a state depends largely 
on the efficacy of the state in discharging its indispensable 
roles. Viewing from a related vantage point, Rotberg (2003:3) 
asserts that states’ pivotal purpose is the provision of the “pub-
lic good of security” in the sense of the ability to ward off ex-
ternal attack and maintain internal order.  
In a nutshell, the practical conception of sovereignty does 
not prevent any state from attending to the domestic needs 
and issues which are pertinent to human survival within its bor-
ders. Regrettably, despite the grasping of this imperative view-
point, evidence in many parts of the Global South shows that 
some states are very weak in willingness and capacity to dis-
charge basic responsibilities to their sub-national actors (if not 
failed or collapsed). While a handful of scholars have raised 
concerns about the security issues associated with state weak-
ness in the modern time (see for instance, Adesoji 2011; 
Buzan 1983; Job 1992; Roehrs 2005; Tonwe and Eke 2013), 
they have not sufficiently explored the multifaceted empirical 
links between state weakness and regional insecurity using a 
specific region as a reference point. It is on this note that this 
article sets out to bridge the gap by drawing on the contempo-
rary realities in the Lake Chad region to elucidate the nodes 
connecting state weakness and regional instability. It specifi-
cally seeks to advance the existing body of knowledge by in-
vestigating whether a state that is unable to efficaciously con-
trol its borders, promptly respond to security emergencies, per-
sistently maintain internal monopoly of the use of force, and 
show considerable capacity in addressing citizens’ needs is 
vulnerable to internal security crises which may further trigger 
regionalised insecurity dilemmas, especially when the neigh-
bouring states have similar attributes. The article employs the 
analytical framework of state weakness, based on the experi-
ence in the Lake Chad region, to deconstruct the (likelihood 
of) instability at the regional level.  
The contribution is located within the need to advance a 
domestic approach to regional stability which has not received 
due attention in mainstream regional security studies. Many 
key scholars who focus on security issues at the regional level 
tend to do so mainly from the theoretical perspective of inter-
state policies, interactions and the pattern of interdependence 
thereof (see for instance, Lemke 2004; Buzan and Wæver 
2003; Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch et al. 1957; Miller 
2007). While such theoretical approaches are very relevant in 
some contexts, they proved less so in other regions, especially 
in Africa where regional security issues are less inter-state ex-
changes, more a direct consequence of shared internal issues 
within contiguous states and the corresponding campaigns of 
sub-national actors. As noted by Keller (1997, 296), “Africa is 
generally considered to be a region where the member states 
face no external threats from each other, and therefore a region 
without a security dilemma.” However, what exists instead, in 
the words of Job (1992, 18), is an “insecurity dilemma” which 
is contingent on internal predicament within states.  
The article is structured in four interrelated sections. The 
first section contextualises the nexus between state weakness 
and regional security instability. It draws attention, specifically, 
to how the inability of a state to exert empirical “stateness” 
within its borders by discharging some indispensable tasks 
could set the stage for internal security unrest that could even 
grow to regional proportions in the eventuality that neighbour-
ing states share the attribute of weakness. The second section 
examines the state’s frailty vis-à-vis the eventual security in-
stability in the Lake Chad region. The essence of this segment 
is to draw on the analytical framework of state weakness to 
explain the rise and regionalisation of terrorism in the Lake 
Chad region. By extension, it is an attempt to place the discus-
sion and analysis in the previous section in context. Section 
three articulates an argument on the primacy of state-building 
as a unique alternative for facilitating enduring regional secu-
rity stability from below through inter-state interactions, mostly 
as related to potential solutions to the Lake Chad security 
question. The concluding section summarises the core argu-
ment of the article. 
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1. State Weakness, National Insecurity, and the Regional 
Insecurity Dilemma 
The post-Cold War realities have expanded the importance of 
regions as socially constructed loci for security interaction, 
management, policy-making and governance (Lake and Mor-
gan 1997). Irrespective of the size or scope of any given re-
gion, stable security is required for it to function effectively, 
mainly in the areas of harnessing human and national re-
sources for regional development, integration and peaceful co-
existence. However, the level of security stability varies greatly 
across regions; while some are predictable and stable in terms 
of human survival and the prevailing socio-political and eco-
nomic order, others are exactly the opposite. Solingen (1998, 
3) categorises the variance into “zones of stable peace” and 
“war zones”. Gaining a clear understanding of the reason some 
regional spaces are prone to security instability requires a 
closer look at two key issues: first, patterns of relations and 
reciprocity among the state actors within the region; and sec-
ond, institutional capacity of the component states in manag-
ing diverse issues within their respective borders. The attention 
of many political analysts, scholars and regional security ex-
perts is mostly concentrated on the first subject, even at the 
expense of the second. Nonetheless, irrespective of the robust-
ness of theoretical analyses in explicating complex regional se-
curity interdependence from the perspective of inter-state en-
gagements, they cannot unpack the contribution of activities 
within states to growing spill-overs and regionalisation of vio-
lent conflicts that spring up without inter-state hostility or ri-
valry (Solingen 1998). It is pertinent that the heart of the sec-
ond matter is state weakness; a germane factor for explaining 
and understanding why some regions are affected by intracta-
ble and complex security instability in the twenty-first century.  
As used in this article, state weakness refers to a situation 
where a state lacks the institutional potency to provide essen-
tial political, economic, social and security services to its citi-
zens, which are pivotal in constructing statehood legitimacy, 
exerting government hegemony, consolidating internal cohe-
sion and securing human survival (Patrick 2006; Rice and Pat-
rick 2008). It is not a function of a country’s military arsenal or 
GDP, but instead based on the institutional capacity to ade-
quately supply the key components listed above. The indica-
tors and description discussed by Patrick (2006) are quite ap-
plicable to the identification of weak states. In the security 
sphere, weak states can usually neither manage their borders 
very well nor harness the required will and capacity to protect 
their nationals from sub-national violent sub-groups. Often, 
such states strive to maintain a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force and tend to unwittingly accommodate violent groups 
that have access to small arms, with these armed groups in 
some instances securing the support/sponsorship of influen-
tial leaders.  
From the political angle, weak states normally have defec-
tive government institutions that are unable to properly guar-
antee protection of individual and minority rights, prevent po-
litical marginalisation of opponents, create an egalitarian so-
ciety where the national leaders emerge based on the true will 
of the people, and encourage accountability of national au-
thorities directly to the people. From the economic perspective, 
weak states lack effective micro-economic policies for attend-
ing to the economic needs of the masses, which in turn poten-
tially creates a high proportion of unemployed youth, thus wid-
ening the gap between the rich and the poor. In terms of social 
welfare, states in this category are usually devoid of competent 
government institutions capable of delivering quality education 
for all and consequently lack the capacity to engage in human 
capital development. This means that weak states may lack 
indigenous human resources to convert natural resources they 
possess into finished products (Patrick 2006; Rice and Patrick 
2008). State weakness is not the same as absence of sover-
eign recognition of a country or total internal breakdown of law 
and order; it is more a matter of poor enforcement of laws, 
inadequate monopoly the use of force, deficient delivery of 
economic/social services, and weak border control, among 
others (Fukuyama 2004a; Newman 2007). 
State weakness may not necessarily be a problem, but it 
has a propensity to prepare the ground for and create internal 
security problems. Unlike strong states, weak states are possi-
ble nurturers of security threats/crises (Rice 2007), a position 
that reflects deficiencies in discharging fundamental functions 
attached to statehood. If a country gravely fails to fulfil eco-
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nomic needs, the legitimacy of its government begins to dwin-
dle, and people begin to look for an alternative group formation 
– for survival, even if this is inimical to societal order. This, in 
turn, has a tendency to encourage the cumulation of griev-
ances against government and defiance of laws. In addition, it 
could also make the youth susceptible to radicalisation, mili-
tancy, extremism, insurgency and other forms of modern polit-
ical violence. At the same time, where borders are not ade-
quately policed, people and arms may enter uncontrolled (Pat-
rick 2006). The summation of these internal activities is likely 
to produce an unsafe atmosphere where sub-national armed 
group(s) may emerge, both to unleash terror on citizens and 
challenge the legitimacy of the conventional forces of the state. 
Such a weak state is then unable to exercise an uncompromis-
ing monopoly over deployment of force (Miller 2007).  
In a nutshell, weak states rarely exert hegemony within their 
borders. More importantly, when a violent uprising breaks out, 
a typical weak state is unable to immediately bring it under 
control. Putting it differently, in the eventual orchestration of 
violent campaigns by sub-national actors, most especially with 
external affiliation, state weakness precludes exertion of effec-
tive control of internal order until it has perhaps degenerated 
into pervasive security unrest. This unconventional vulnerability 
to security perils strongly differentiates weak states from strong 
ones. As argued by Max Weber in the early twentieth century, 
supremacy over the utilisation of physical force within the ge-
ographical confines of a sovereign entity is a central charac-
teristic of the state (Simpson 2008). Wendt (1999) maintains 
that state actors are fundamental players controlling internal 
systematic violence. Whenever a state fails in this capacity and 
lacks institutional efficacy in fulfilling the societal expectations 
of citizens, the formation of radical groups challenging the con-
ventional and societal order is likely.  
According to Snow (2012, 285), one pivotal contemporary 
problem confronting the international system is “unstable 
member states, especially states that may cease to function 
effectively as internal … actors, or other states that are or might 
move in the direction of dysfunction”. Similarly, Fukuyama 
(2004a, 120) argues that “weak states have posed threats to 
international order because they are the source of conflict[s]” 
which in most instances spawn humanitarian crises and exten-
sive human displacement. The direct linkage between fragile 
states and the conspicuous tendency towards security threats 
is a fundamental challenge that is eating deep into the fabric 
of security sectors in many regions in the Global South today. 
This tends to breed injustice, division, grievances, violence ex-
tremism, and conflicts, and serves as potential “incubator or 
conveyor belt” of security woes that are potent enough to rav-
age even national stability (Rice 2007, 33). In other words, 
weak states are at the forefront of the factors that compromise 
human and national security in contemporary times. Most, if 
not all, violent internal conflicts in sovereign states since the 
end of the Cold War have occurred in weak states located 
largely in the Global South. 
This is one of the major problems that many countries in 
the Global South are facing today and explains, at least in part, 
why many weak states have been in deep security crises for a 
long time, without any obvious way out. It is particularly appli-
cable to African countries like Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan. Because the institutions to 
effectively regulate internal order and promptly respond to fun-
damental needs in the polity are lacking, ensuring stable and 
secure environment would be a Herculean task. It must be rec-
ognised, however, that today’s security challenges are not lim-
ited to weak states; even the strong Western countries are not 
without domestic security issues (Patrick 2006). However, 
while many of these strong states have the will and capacity to 
handle their specific problems, a substantial number of weak 
states lack the required wherewithal to do so, allowing these 
problems to degenerate into transnational humanitarian emer-
gencies. In addition, notwithstanding the analysis presented 
above on the connection between state weakness and national 
security instability, note that not all weak states are subject to 
(persistent) internal violent conflicts. This is one of the reasons 
why some scholars argue that the correlation between state 
weakness and terrorism is more complex than is frequently pre-
sumed in the literature (Patrick 2006; Newman 2007). Alt-
hough this article is not about terrorism, the underpinning of 
this variance is clear: it depends on the existence or absence 
of triggers and extent to which individual states in this category  
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can manage their own weakness. Moreover, no two weak 
states are the same. Rice and Patrick (2008) categorise weak 
states broadly into critically weak states and “mere” weak 
states. The line between stable weak state and conflict-ridden 
weak state is very blurred. 
Apart from its negative implications for the stabilisation of 
national polities, state weakness is not without links to regional 
security instability. The concept of regional instability, as con-
strued in this article, is not limited to cases where a security 
issue or violent conflict affects every part of a region, but also 
includes situations when the need to address a security men-
ace becomes a regional concern or can hardly be handled 
comprehensively without a regional approach. In order to com-
prehend the nodes connecting the two variables, one needs to 
understand that regions normally have states as their compo-
nent parts. Even where a regional space is not defined by state 
borders, it may cut across a geographical area that is not lo-
cated within a single state (Fawcett 2005). What transpires 
within the national political units of a regional space has direct 
or indirect consequences for the entire region. Although secu-
rity woes caused by the weakness of a state within its borders 
do not always generate regionalised security unrest, negative 
security externalities and regional dimensions of instability be-
come probable or unavoidable where at least three conditions 
apply: The first condition in this regard relates to presence of 
shared weakness among neighbouring states which may lead 
to a spontaneous spill-over of violent conflicts. This may even 
facilitate cross-border mobilisation of combatants and cross-
border hideouts (reinforcement in one state, attack in an-
other). It reinforces the argument proposed by Lake (1997, 
50) that “internal state weakness may also create negative se-
curity externalities for neighbouring states if that weakness cre-
ates havens for insurgents”.  
Second, strong cultural and religious ties across national 
boundaries may also spread political violence and security un-
rest from a weak state to other states and thereby create re-
gional insecurity. Few other factors, if any, create such suitable 
avenues for cross-border recruitment of combatants and 
spreading of conflict across a regional space. The third condi-
tion in this category is the issue of refugee flows and their re-
gional implications. As Wyler (2008) correctly notes, security 
instability within a weak state has a way of spilling over to con-
tiguous states via large refugee flows. Individuals who escape 
unbearable political violence in a weak state are normally scat-
tered across neighbouring states with the hope of seeking 
safety. In this case, the initial problem of one weak state not 
only turns out to be a concern for other states, but also com-
plicates existing security stability throughout the regional 
space. A region where refugees are dispersed across compo-
nent states is unlikely to experience security stabilisation until 
the source of refugee flows is resolved. In another scenario in-
surgents or terrorists may mingle with refugees in their camps 
to unleash violence, even in the receiving states (Loescher and 
Milner 2005).  
The crux of the argument here is simple. Irrespective of the 
political cooperation and peaceful interdependence among 
state actors in a given region, the security structures in the re-
gion can hardly be stable when one, some or all of the com-
ponent states are at a point of critical weakness. Uncontrolla-
ble fragility of contiguous states is one of the principal factors 
that can harm regions from below the level of inter-state inter-
actions. This is by no way an attempt to downplay the impact 
of state-centricity on regional security (Fawn 2009). Govern-
ment policies and patterns of inter-state interaction are still 
very relevant in describing a region either as a conflict zone or 
zone of peace. Nevertheless, just as the actions of states are 
important in determining how peaceful or conflicting a region 
is, other factors, especially state weakness also remain pivotal 
in explaining the extent of security stabilisation in regions. This 
is partly because many regions are so intertwined with respect 
to geographical proximity, security interdependence and stra-
tegic dealings (Iwilade and Agbo 2012; Miller 2007; Morgan 
1997). Buzan and Wæver (2003) corroborate this line of ar-
gument when they assert that regional security concerns are 
normally clustered in such a way that the (in)security of one 
actor interacts with the (in)security of other actors. The peculi-
arities in a particular region in terms of cultural affinity, reli-
gious resemblance, common predicaments and porous bor-
ders are instrumental in stretching conflict and threats across 
borders, especially in a volatile region (Brown 1996). Not sur-
prisingly, Patrick (2006) holds that a regional configuration 
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with many contiguous debilitated states risks high tendency for 
regional instability. 
 
2. State Weakness and Security Instability in the Lake 
Chad Region 
The countries that have parts of their territories in the Lake 
Chad region are Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. It is no 
more an idle speculation that the regional space has become 
one of Africa’s hotbeds of security instability, violence and hu-
manitarian crisis (Oginni et al. 2018). The troubles affecting 
this region in the twenty-first century are not unconnected to 
the rise of the Boko Haram extremist group (Maiangwa 2013). 
As an extremist group formed around 2002 in Maiduguri, Ni-
geria, it metamorphosed into a terrorist group in 2009 and an 
insurgent organisation in 2014 (Walker 2012; Obamamoye 
2016). It is one of the clandestine fanatic groups that combine 
the attributes of new terrorism and insurgency. Its objective has 
expanded over the years from correcting purported Islamic 
decadence to campaigning against “Western civilisation” to 
carving out an Islamic state (Pürçek 2014, 8). The strategies 
employed by Boko Haram’s adherents in accomplishing the 
above goals range from proselytising to terrorism and insur-
gency (including suicide bombings, shootings, school raids, 
large-scale kidnapping and invasion of military bases). The vi-
olent nature of the uprising caused settlements to be aban-
doned, disrupted nearly the entire educational system in the 
northeast Nigeria at the time, rendered hundreds of thousands 
homeless, and triggered an unprecedented refugee and inter-
nal displacement crisis across the Lake Chad region (Man-
tzikos 2014; Akinola 2015). 
What was initially considered by neighbouring states as a 
Nigerian domestic challenge eventually turned into a regional 
problem (Weeraratne 2015). Oyewole (2015, 428) aptly 
noted that the group has “emerged as one of the greatest 
threats to human security in Africa, and the Lake Chad region 
in particular”. The effects of the threats and insecurity gener-
ated by Boko Haram ultimately transcended the confines of 
Nigeria’s borders. Other states in the Lake Chad region – Cam-
eroon, Chad and Niger – are also affected (although less se-
verely than Nigeria) as the combatants have gradually ex-
panded their geographical area of operations (Marc, Verjee 
and Mogaka 2015). Persistent attacks have led to the kidnap-
ping, displacement, and killing of Cameroonian nationals. 
Other effects include an alarming refugee influx into Cameroon 
as well as the attacks against the territorial integrity of Niger, 
chief of which was the Bosso attack where many Nigerian sol-
diers were killed. As a result of the regional dimension of the 
Boko Haram menace, the Multinational Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF), with contributing troops from the four affected states 
(and Benin), is currently serving as the platform through which 
the states in the Lake Chad region respond to the uprising 
(Obamamoye 2016).  
With the benefit of hindsight, one of the best ways to de-
construct the emergence of the security menace in Nigeria and 
the subsequent regional security crisis in the Lake Chad region 
is through the analytical framework of state weakness, as dis-
cussed earlier. It should be acknowledged at this juncture that 
a few previous studies (see for instance Adesoji 2011; Ona-
pajo and Uzodike 2012; Maiangwa et al. 2012; Tonwe and 
Eke 2013) have in one or other way pointed out the role that 
state fragility played in the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. What 
is lacking is an analysis that explores its regional facets. This 
section sets out to build on the existing debate while elaborat-
ing its regional dynamics. 
The weakness of the Nigerian state was central to the emer-
gence and expansion of the Boko Haram terrorist group. This 
position can be explicated in different interconnected spheres. 
In the economic realm, the Nigerian state has, over the years, 
greatly underperformed in harnessing the human and natural 
resources at its disposal to alleviate the increasing economic 
hardship of the masses. There are alarmingly high levels of 
youth un(der)employment, poverty, income disparity and other 
deleterious economic indicators in the Nigerian socio-eco-
nomic landscape. According to the 2015 National Human De-
velopment Report, Nigeria’s economy is plagued by unabated 
poverty and unemployment despite its position as the largest 
economy in Africa (UNDP 2015). Similarly, based on the report 
from the National Bureau of Statistics (2015), the number of 
under-employed and unemployed individuals in Nigeria in-
creased to 20.7 million in the third quarter of 2015. Nigerian 
Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo said that about “110 million Ni-
gerians were living in poverty”, with “two-tenth of
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extreme poverty” (The Punch, 16 July 2016). The situation is 
even more critical and complex in northeast Nigeria, the hot-
bed of the on-going terrorist crisis. The National Bureau of Sta-
tistics (2017) reported that northeast Nigeria had the highest 
rate of under-employment in the country at the end of 2017.  
Therefore, despite the availability of natural resources, 
many Nigerians, especially in the northeast, find themselves 
struggling to subsist in a situation that can only be described 
as the survival of the fittest. The above indicators stem from 
the domestic governance crisis in Nigeria and its dysfunctional 
institutions which have subjected citizens to severe suffering 
and made them vulnerable to extremist dispositions. Pürçek 
(2014) maintains that “so long as the federal government do 
not [sic] eradicate the lingering poverty…, the terror in Nigeria 
look [sic] unlikely to end”. While this article does not argue 
that prevailing economic conditions are the main trigger of the 
Boko Haram terrorist rebellion – despite the arguments of 
some scholars in that direction (Asuelime and David 2015; 
Khan and Cheri 2016) – it maintains that widespread poverty 
and youth unemployment in Nigeria’s northeast facilitated ini-
tial recruitment of the terrorist group. At the outset Boko Haram 
usurped the welfare responsibility of the state by providing 
food, financial support and other incentives for impoverished 
young individuals as a strategic technique of proselytisation 
and luring people into their extremist ideology. Some of cap-
tured terrorists in Yobe State attested to this strategic under-
taking (Walker 2012; Asuelime and David 2015). 
On the political front, Nigerian state has many issues still 
unresolved. Although the country has seen successive chang-
ing governments through periodic elections, it still lacks 
enough credible institutions to safeguard liberal political best 
practices. Internal politics in Nigeria is mainly about winners 
taking charge of the state’s resources. Many politicians across 
the country are noted for employing whatever means are nec-
essary to cling onto power (Ake 1996). This may include spon-
sorship of radical groups in order to intimidate opposing can-
didates and citizens (Akinola 2015). Obi (2004, 114) de-
scribes the trend as “patrimonial networks lubricated and re-
produced through the distribution of oil largesse”. Thus, the 
Nigerian state allows reckless craving for political power at the 
expense of common security concerns. This was the exact po-
litical situation that unleashed the group which eventually be-
came known as Boko Haram. One of the groups clandestinely 
sponsored by gubernatorial candidate Ali Modu Sheriff in ad-
vance of the 2003 general elections was led by Mohammed 
Yusuf, the first leader of the Boko Haram. When Ali Modu Sher-
iff won the election and became Governor of Borno State, Mo-
hammed Yusuf was appointed to the Borno State Sharia Board 
(Akinola 2015; Weeraratne 2015). This provided initial con-
nections, enlargement, appropriation, empowerment and lo-
gistical support for the group in pursuit of Islamic extremist 
ideology. After a few years, the group grew stronger and de-
manded strict application of sharia law. The governor’s refusal 
set the stage for the violent attacks which government forces 
are still battling today (Adesoji 2011). This is one of many in-
stances relating to misguided politics in Nigeria, especially be-
fore 2015 (see Joseph 1987). A strong state with viable polit-
ical institutions would safeguard internal political affairs from 
developments that make the country susceptible to instability. 
As noted by Ismail (2013, 216), “radical groups often emerge 
in the context of overt or covert support by political elites who 
tap into their popularity and youth membership for political 
gains”. 
In the context of security, the dysfunctional nature of the 
Nigerian state system was also revealed in its failure to main-
tain the monopoly of the use of force that would have neutral-
ised the Boko Haram terrorist group as soon as it was discov-
ered in 2009. Wendt (1999, 193) argues that “states are key 
actors in the regulation of organised violence”. From 2009 un-
til early 2015, members of the terrorist group successfully de-
fied Nigerian intelligence agencies, perpetrated mayhem and 
controlled a significant swathe of Nigerian territory. Walker 
(2012, 11) acknowledges that “the security services’ inability 
to deal with Boko Haram in any meaningful way [especially 
before early 2015] has highlighted the extreme weakness in 
its capacity to carry out investigations.” For instance, the mass 
abduction of Chibok school girls on 14 April 2014 caught the 
government unawares and over four years later, many of the 
kidnapped school girls are yet to be released, despite the un-
usual approach of negotiations and concessions. The former 
IJCV: Vol. 13/2019 







Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, reprimanded the lead-
ership of the country for the failure to act until 72 hours after 
the abduction of the school girls (Daily Post, 6 February 2016). 
This is not typical of a competent state. For instance, when 
terrorists attacked several locations in France on 13 November 
2015, all the perpetrators were not only immediately and pub-
licly identified, but also brought to justice.  
On a related note, Nigerian armed forces failed on various 
occasions to maintain superiority of firepower over Boko 
Harem, creating opportunities for the terrorists to raid prisons 
and military bases and pillage arms with impunity (Bappah 
2016). As a further illustration of state failure, it is on record 
that some of the Nigerian soldiers fled when Boko Haram over-
ran the headquarters of the MNJTF in Baga on 5 January 2015 
(Akinola 2015). After this particular incident the essential in-
gredient of Nigerian “stateness” became questionable (Wendt 
1999). Brainard, Chollet, and LaFleur (2007) correctly con-
tend that “weak governments are often unable to adequately 
control their territory”. At the time of writing, the Nigerian gov-
ernment still depends on the advanced states for supplying 
sophisticated weapons (including for internal security), with 
sales often refused on grounds of human rights violations.  
Moreover, many of the Nigerian borders are far from being 
properly controlled. Their vulnerability is further complicated by 
the ill-equipped and corrupt personnel securing the borders 
and the difficult terrain separating Nigeria from neighbouring 
states. Former Nigerian interior minister Abba Moro, confirmed 
this when he noted that the number of irregular entry routes 
into Nigeria outnumbered the regular ones (Onuoha 2013). 
The covert message was that Nigeria is unable to thoroughly 
account for the inflow and outflow of migrants, especially ille-
gal ones. Patrick (2006, 36) asserts that “states that do not 
control borders or territory facilitate terrorist infiltration and op-
erations”. Therefore, the inability of a state to control its bor-
ders is a sure sign of susceptibility to infiltration and attacks. 
Boko Haram strategically takes advantage of this inadequacy 
to smuggle in weapons and foreign nationals from contiguous 
states. It facilitates Boko Haram’s joint training with other ter-
rorist groups in states like Mali and Somalia; and encourages 
cross-border hit-and-run operations and establishment of 
hideouts in neighbouring states (Weeraratne 2015). In the 
words of Adesoji (2011, 114), “the porosity of the Nigerian 
borders has made it possible for foreigners who share ethnic 
and religious affinities with Nigerians to slip into the country 
and enlist or otherwise join the fanatics’ army”. This shortcom-
ing has significantly helped the group to recruit members from 
other states and allowed it to use hideouts in neighbouring ter-
ritories to carry out attacks in Nigeria. The first line of defence 
against national insecurity is the border, so a state’s failure to 
effectively manage its border is a direct indicator of weakness. 
The rise of Boko Haram as a feared terrorist organisation 
posing unparalleled threats to Nigeria’s territorial integrity and 
human security is not unconnected to the economic, political 
and security ineffectiveness of the Nigerian state. In this re-
gard, the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World cat-
egorises Nigeria as a critically weak state (Rice and Patrick 
2008). Weeraratne (2015, 17) succinctly states that “the gen-
eral weakness of the Nigerian state forms the backdrop of 
many explanatory accounts of [the] Boko Haram-related vio-
lence”. It should be noted, however, that while Nigeria is de-
scribed as a weak state in connection with the rise of Boko 
Haram, that is not to deny its status as an African giant and 
one of the world’s leading peacekeeping contributors. The 
yardstick for the analysis here is not based on national poten-
tial or external role, but on the willingness/capacity of the state 
to effectively handle significant domestic issues.  
From the regional perspective, security instability in the 
Lake Chad region could not have been prevented. First, weak-
ness on the part of the Nigerian state allowed non-state terror-
ist forces to build momentum, networks and a territorial base, 
as well as expanding its membership and gaining access to 
sophisticated weapons. This provided an avenue for the grad-
ual local and cross-border spread of violence once the prevail-
ing conditions permitted it. Second, the state weakness syn-
drome is not limited to Nigeria in the Lake Chad region. Nige-
ria’s neighbours in the region, especially Cameroon and Niger, 
also have their own weaknesses. Issues related to poverty and 
porous borders are common across the Lake Chad region. 
These neighbours were unable to properly control their borders 
to prevent initial terrorist usage of their territorial spaces, both 
as a theatre of violence and for hideouts. In this case, prevent-
ing the expansion of Nigeria’s internal instability into regional 
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instability became impossible. Third, ethno-religious, cultural 
and historical affinities among people residing in the region are 
not clearly demarcated by national borders. This was a direct 
consequence of “arbitrary border demarcations by colonial 
powers” (Oginni et al. 2018, 1). This enabled Boko Haram to 
mobilise combatants who have sympathy for “the struggle” 
across countries in the region. Fourth, the flow of refugees 
across national borders further reinforces the regional dimen-
sion of the instability.  
The situation in the Lake Chad region demonstrates how 
weakness of a state or group of states can trigger regional se-
curity instability. Regional security can never be sustained 
where state actors fail to fulfil central responsibilities properly. 
Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall argue (quoted in Wendt 
1999, 202) that the state is an institution “by which conflict is 
handled, society is ruled, and social relations are governed”. 
The reality in the Lake Chad region has got to the point where 
security issues are a subject of regional concern and no single 
state has the ability to proffer a lasting solution without the 
support of others. Rather, regional cooperation and efforts are 
required to combat the direct consequences of the insurgency 
and its indirect as well as immediate causes. The United Na-
tions Security Council expresses the same position when it “en-
courages governments in the region to sustain momentum, 
[and] further enhance regional military cooperation and coor-
dination” (UNSC Resolution 2349, 2017, 3). The strengthen-
ing of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional 
initiative for security stability in the Lake Chad region is a sig-
nificant security arrangement and highlights the need for a re-
gional approach (Obamamoye 2017).  
 
3. Addressing Security Instability in the Lake Chad 
Region: The Imperative of State-Building 
One of the dominant concerns that occupy the attention of pol-
icy-makers in the Lake Chad region today is how to finally dis-
lodge Islamist terrorists and create enduring regional security 
stability to allow peaceful coexistence. This singular project has 
(re)directed the focus of leaders across the regional space to-
wards the pursuit of better inter-state military cooperation via 
the instrument of the Lake Chad Basin Commission 
(Obama-moye 2016). This reinvigorated collaborative engage-
ment seeks to rescue human and national security from the 
new patterns of violent extremism and threats of terrorist at-
tacks that beset the space. Indeed, this became unavoidable 
after indiscriminate attacks, suicide bombings, community 
raids and other atrocities by the violent non-state actors cre-
ated an unprecedented wave of security threats to lives and 
property in the region. A notable measure collectively put in 
place by these states is the revival of the Multinational Joint 
Task Force for counter-terrorism. The regional force possesses 
a mandate to create a safe environment, restore lost territorial 
integrity and ensure safe return of refugees (African Union 
2015). As argued elsewhere, although such a regional re-
sponse is conventional and exigent, the strategy alone is at 
best reactionary and palliative with no capacity to deliver 
needed long-lasting solution (see Obamamoye 2017). 
The more reliable pathways to peace and security as de-
scribed in this article, which many policy-makers often over-
look or ignore, revolve around state-building through enhance-
ment of government responsibility and improved domestic gov-
ernance (Sawyer 2004; Marc, Verjee and Mogaka 2015). The 
major threats in the region are sub-national terrorists operating 
within the borders of the states in the region. The remedy there-
fore lies within the constituent states. Second, Boko Haram is 
largely a product of states’ weakness in discharging their basic 
functions (Yusuf 2013). As established earlier, the govern-
ment’s inadequate capacity to fulfil citizens’ economic needs, 
prohibit counterproductive “illiberal” democratic practices, 
prevent porous borders, and dispense necessary internal se-
curity tasks allowed violent extremism to proliferate. Therefore, 
besides on-going regional security cooperation as a way of re-
sponding to the by-products of governance crisis (terrorism 
and insurgency), deliberate attention needs to be directed to 
the state-building project in order to resolve the root causes.  
At the heart of the state-building approach to national/re-
gional stability is institutional empowerment for effective gov-
ernance. As defined by Fukuyama (2004b, 17), state-building 
means “the creation of new government institutions and the 
strengthening of the existing ones”. This is an issue that many 
states in the Lake Chad region, particularly Nigeria in this in- 
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stance, have been unable to properly address. Nigeria suffers 
high rates of youth unemployment and poverty despite having 
enormous natural resources at its disposal (Khan and Cheri 
2016). While the number of students graduating from higher 
institutions yearly grows exponentially, the available job oppor-
tunities increase only arithmetically. Furthermore, systemic 
corruption, embezzlement of government funds and persistent 
non-accountability continue unabated. The unresolved issue of 
institutional deficiencies of security agencies also makes mat-
ters even more complicated. These trends have adversely af-
fected Nigerian society, as reflected in the growing governance 
gap, crime rate, conflict, militancy and violent extremism. No 
level of regional collaboration can solve these problems; the 
solution lies in the strengthening of internal institutions and 
improving domestic governance. Government institutions if 
empowered have the potential to be more responsive, thus re-
ducing governance gap, creating a national sense of belong-
ing, connecting the state to the society and tackling security 
challenges (Bappah 2016). This empowerment is the best way 
to provide sustainable solutions to human, national, and re-
gional insecurity.  
Furthermore, domestic security institutions across the re-
gion, particularly within Nigeria’s space, require empowerment 
and restructuring. The core instrument for any state to maintain 
law and order, without which there is no “stateness”, is the 
national security apparatus. Unfortunately, many of Nigeria’s 
security agencies have been so crippled by corruption and 
complacency that they are unable to discharge their duties ef-
fectively. In the same vein, the porous nature of Nigerian bor-
ders allowed radical groups like Boko Haram to obtain sophis-
ticated weapons (Weeraratne 2015). These are the major rea-
sons why Nigeria could not redress the Boko Haram problem 
before it became a major security challenge. All these issues 
suggest that immediate internal restructuring and overhauling 
of national security institutions in is imperative. That would per-
mit efficient management of situations before they deteriorate 
into threats.  
State-building through the enhancement of government’s 
domestic responsibility, as described in this article, is applica-
ble not only to the Nigerian state, but also to other states in 
the Lake Chad region. Once the four countries are ready to re-
store security stability in their respective spaces, regional in-
stability will quickly become history.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The article examined the nuanced links and interactions be-
tween state weakness (which manifests when a government 
lacks the institutional potency to provide essential services in-
ternally) and regional security instability. It became imperative 
because the domestic government’s approach to regional se-
curity has not received due attention in mainstream regional 
security studies. Unlike previous studies, this article used con-
temporary developments in the Lake Chad region to explore 
the connections between the two variables – state weakness 
and regional instability. Overall, it contended that activities 
within and across constituting states of a given region are al-
ternative factors in determining the security stability or other-
wise in the regional space. In other words, this article has ar-
gued that any state that could not efficaciously manage its 
borders, promptly respond to security emergencies and 
demonstrate considerable capacity in addressing citizens’ 
needs is vulnerable to regionalised security instability, espe-
cially when the neighbouring states share similar characteris-
tics. Therefore, just as hostile inter-state relations can trigger 
regional security instability, so also can the weakness of 
states. Whenever states fail in carrying out their basic roles – 
such as maintaining an internal monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force, building institutions to pragmatically respond to the 
myriad needs of citizens and ensuring effective border man-
agement – domestic rebellion with possible regional implica-
tions becomes likely. Among other things, this is a response to 
the observation raised by Tavares (2009, 154) that “literature 
on regional security has so far neglected the question of how 
peace and (in)security become regionalized”. 
This article argued that sustainable stabilisation of a region 
suffering trans-state terrorism demands state-building through 
institutional empowerment. This is particularly applicable as a 
durable strategy for resolving the security crisis affecting the 
Lake Chad region. In addition to a regional military arrange-
ment that would only react to the symptoms of state weakness,  
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rebuilding government institutions will facilitate and strengthen 
their capacity to resolve the challenges that triggered or region-
alised the conflict in the first place. Although Boko Haram laid 
claim to religion as the main factor propelling the ongoing vio-
lent campaigns, the weakness of state(s) in the region, espe-
cially the Nigerian state, hampered their early response to 
these attacks. The Nigerian government was therefore unable 
to hinder the group’s operations before it had subdued about 
fourteen different local governments, killed tens of thousands 
and rendered millions homeless. Since this new dimension of 
insecurity in the Lake Chad region emanated from sub-state 
actors, remedy should be sought primarily within the compo-
nent states through assertive governmental responsiveness.  
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